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Note
Big Enough To Matter: Whether Statistical
Significance or Practical Significance Should Be
the Test for Title VII Disparate Impact Claims
Elliot Ko
Seventeen years ago, the Boston Police Department began
1
testing its officers and cadets for illegal drug use. Less than
one percent of the force’s officers and cadets tested positive for
2
illegal drug use. But African-American officers and cadets
tested positive for illegal drug use almost five times more fre3
quently than white officers and cadets. Ten African-American
officers and cadets sued the Boston Police Department, arguing
that the department’s drug testing program violated Title VII
4
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs probably expected the police department to defend its drug testing program
5
on the grounds that it was a matter of “business necessity.” Instead, this case addressed the unearthed and often-neglected
6
legal question: What does “disparate impact” mean?
Title VII broadly proscribes the use of any employment
practice that “causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
7
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” But what does “disparate impact” mean? Does it mean any disparity that is statisti-

 J.D., 2016, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks to
Professor Jessica Clarke, Adam Beaupre, Kusha Mohammadi, Gregory Escobar, Danielle Builta, and the Minnesota Law Review staff for their input and
help with preparing this Note. Copyright © 2016 by Elliot Ko.
1. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2014).
2. Id. at 42–43, 44.
3. Id. at 43.
4. Id. at 41.
5. Cf. id. at 54–55 (leaving this question “open for further consideration”).
6. See Michael Stenger, The First Circuit Strikes Out in Jones v. City of
Boston: A Pitch for Practical Significance in Disparate Impact Cases, 60 VILL.
L. REV. 411, 413–14 (2015).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).
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cally significant, no matter how small that disparity may be?
Or does it refer only to a disparity that is both statistically and
9
practically significant? Why does this matter? Statistical significance measures the likelihood that a certain disparity is due
10
to random chance instead of some other factor. Practical significance, on the other hand, asks whether this disparity is
11
large enough to matter in practical terms. In many cases, a
disparity that is statistically significant will also be practically
12
significant. But not always. In some cases, statistically significant disparities may “have little or no real-world im13
portance.” Thus, the courts’ answer to the question posed
above can either doom or save claims with a high level of statistical significance but a low level of practical significance.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has provided
14
much guidance on this question. Title VII itself prohibits the
use of any employment practice that would “adversely affect” or
15
otherwise have a “disparate impact” on minorities. Neither
16
term, however, is defined in Title VII. As for the Supreme
Court, it has alternately spoken of employment practices that
disqualify minorities at “a substantially higher rate” than non17
18
minority applicants; “significant statistical disparit[ies]”; and
19
statistical disparities that have a “significantly different,”
20
“significantly greater,” or “significantly discriminatory im8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See discussion and cases cited infra Part I.C.1.
See discussion and cases cited infra Part I.C.2.
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
See infra Part I.B.3.
See infra Part I.B.3.
BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 124 (4th ed. 2007) (“The Supreme Court has variously spoken of
‘statistical disparities . . . sufficiently substantial [to] raise an inference of causation,’ a ‘significantly different’ selection rate, and a ‘substantially disproportionate’ disqualification rate as constituting evidence of adverse impact, but it
has given no definitive guidance on ‘just what threshold mathematical showing of variance . . . suffices as a “substantial disproportionate impact.”’ . . .
[A]nd the text of Title VII, as amended by the 1991 Act, provides no definitive
answer.” (citations omitted)).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), (k) (2012).
16. See, e.g., id. § 2000e (defining many terms, but not “adverse affect” or
“disparate impact”).
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).
18. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
20. N.Y. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 586 (1979).
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pact” on minorities. At other times, the Court has spoken of
statistical disparities that are large enough to have sufficient
22
“probative value” or that are “sufficiently substantial” to
23
“raise . . . an inference of causation.” In still other instances,
the Supreme Court has cited the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) four-fifths rule (a rough proxy for
both practical and statistical significance) and standard deviation analysis (a test for statistical significance) as possible tests
24
for disparate impact claims. What the Supreme Court has not
done is clarify whether a “significant” disparity is one that is
25
statistically significant or practically significant. This has led
26
to a split in the lower courts on this question.
This Note catalogs the circuit split on this question. It also
analyzes the text, legislative history, and judicial interpretation of Title VII to determine whether practical significance
should be a necessary element of every disparate impact claim.
Part I briefly summarizes the history of disparate impact
claims, introduces the difference between statistical and practical significance, and examines each circuit’s case law on this issue. Part II argues that the text of Title VII, its legislative history, and applicable Supreme Court precedent should not
require plaintiffs to prove practical significance as part of their
prima facie cases. Part III makes two proposals. First, courts
should abolish the practical significance requirement as part of
the plaintiff’s prima facie case and adopt a rebuttable presumption that any statistically significant disparity is a “disparate impact” for the purposes of Title VII disparate impact
claims. Second, to the extent that courts still wish to retain
practical significance as a way for a defendant to rebut the presumption that a statistically significant disparity is actionable
under Title VII, courts should develop a more concrete test for
measuring practical significance.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
Id. at 463 n.7.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 995.
Id. at 995 n.3.
See, e.g., id. at 995.
See infra Part I.C.
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I. THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS AND
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
STATISTICAL AND PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
This Part explores the history of disparate impact claims,
explains the difference between statistical and practical significance, and surveys the existing case law on this issue. Its purpose is to summarize the development of disparate impact liability from 1971 to the current day. Its purpose is also to
explain why the distinction between statistical and practical
significance matters in the real world and summarize the existing case law on whether practical significance is required for
disparate impact claims. To that end, Section A briefly lays out
the history of disparate impact theory. Section B explains the
difference between statistical and practical significance. Finally, Section C examines each circuit’s case law on this question.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Title VII, as it was originally enacted, did not contain the
27
words “disparate impact.” It did, however, prohibit employers
from “discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of
28
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”
or acting in any other way “which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
29
adversely affect his status as an employee.” Seven years after
Title VII’s enactment, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court held that this language prohibited not only intentional discrimination “because” of a protected characteristic,
but also facially neutral policies that had the effect of dispro30
portionately harming minorities. In other words, Title VII
prohibits “not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form but discriminatory in practice[],” at least if
31
such practices are not justified by “business necessity.” The

27. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) (containing no subsection (k), six years after Title VII
was originally enacted).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
29. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
31. Id. at 431. If the challenged employment practice is “absolutely essential to the operation” of the business, the employer may assert this as an affirmative defense to Title VII liability. Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the
Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding
the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (1996).
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first type of claim came to be known as a “disparate treatment”
claim, whereas the second was called a “disparate impact”
32
claim. A disparate treatment claim is appropriate when an
employer intentionally discriminates against an applicant or an
33
employee because of her race, sex, or religion. A disparate impact claim, on the other hand, is appropriate when an employer
adopts a facially neutral practice that disproportionately harms
members of a protected class, even if the employer had no ill in34
tent or animus towards members of that class.
Seventeen years after Griggs, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
35
Atonio, the Supreme Court “significantly” cut back the scope
36
of disparate impact claims in three ways. First, the Court imposed a “causation requirement,” requiring the plaintiff to show
as part of his prima facie case that the statistical disparity
complained of was the “result” of one or more specific employ37
ment practices. Second, the Court lowered the standard for
the employer’s affirmative defense, allowing employers to rebut
a disparate impact claim by simply pointing to a “legitimate
business justification” for the challenged employment prac38
tice. Third, the Court held that the employer only bore the
burden of production, and not the burden of persuasion, on its
39
business justification defense.
This regime only lasted two years. In 1991, Congress
40
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This Act did three things.
First, the Act implicitly ratified the viability of disparate impact theory by stating that an unlawful employment practice

32. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining the
difference between these two types of claims).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
36. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the impact
of Wards Cove).
37. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
38. See id. at 659 (“[A]t the justification stage of . . . a disparate-impact
case, the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer . . . . [T]here is no
requirement that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the
employer’s business for it to pass muster . . . .”).
39. See id. at 659–60.
40. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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41

could be “based on disparate impact.” Second, the Act partially codified Wards Cove’s first holding by requiring the plaintiff
to prove that “a particular employment practice . . . cause[d] a
42
disparate impact,” unless “the elements of a respondent’s decision making process are not capable of separation for analy43
sis.” Third, the Act abrogated the last two holdings of Wards
Cove and restored pre-Wards Cove case law on the business necessity defense by putting the burden of proof on the employer
to prove that a challenged employment practice was “consistent
44
with business necessity.”
More recently, the Supreme Court has extended disparate
impact theory to two other anti-discrimination statutes: the
45
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and the Fair
46
Housing Act.
B. STATISTICAL VS. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: TWO DIFFERENT
THINGS
This Section attempts to explain the difference between
statistical and practical significance. Even though statistical
and practical significance are two different things, many courts
47
do not analyze these concepts separately. To make matters
worse, there is little consensus on how to measure these two
48
different concepts, if they are required in the first place. Subsection 1 explains what statistical significance means and how
to measure it. Subsection 2 does the same for practical significance. Subsection 3 discusses when the difference between sta-

41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 624
(describing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as “formally codif[ying] the disparateimpact component of Title VII”).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
43. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (reiterating Wards
Cove’s causation requirement and describing Wards Cove as “superseded by
statute on other grounds”).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
45. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235–38 (2005).
46. See Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
47. See cases cited infra Part I.C. This imprecision is also common in the
academic literature. See, e.g., Scott W. McKinley, The Need for Legislative or
Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and How Employers in the Sixth Circuit Can Survive the Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171 (2008) (discussing both
the four-fifths rule and various ways to measure statistical significance without distinguishing between statistical and practical significance).
48. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
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tistical and practical significance might actually matter in a real-world case.
1. Statistical Significance
Broadly speaking, statistical significance attempts to
measure the likelihood that a statistical disparity is attributa49
ble to something more than chance. To ask whether a certain
employment practice adversely affects a protected class in a
statistically significant way is another way of asking whether
there is some “relationship” between “the challenged employ50
ment practice” and membership in a protected class. Some
courts have referred to statistical significance as an “indication
51
of causation.” Statistical analysis, however, can never “conclu52
sively establish the cause . . . for an observed disparity.” At
best, it can suggest that it is highly unlikely that a certain ad53
verse impact on a protected class is due solely to chance.
Statisticians use a variety of tests to measure statistical
54
significance. The relative merits of these tests is beyond the
55
scope of this Note, as are the precise details of how to conduct
56
these tests. That said, a basic understanding of some of the
terms used in this field may be helpful for understanding what
courts mean when they use certain statistical terms. Three
terms bear special mention here: (a) p-values; (b) confidence intervals; and (c) standard deviations.

49. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2014); STEPHANIE R.
THOMAS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE IMPACT: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE 25 (2011).
50. THOMAS, supra note 49, at 44–45.
51. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 40 (2011); see also
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994–95 (1988) (correlating
statistical testing with the causation requirement of Title VII).
52. THOMAS, supra note 49, at 63.
53. Id. at 25.
54. See, e.g., id. at 41–61 (describing binomial distribution analysis,
hypergeometric distribution analysis, the Chi Square Test, Fisher’s Exact
Test, the Mantel-Haenszel Test, and logistic regression analysis as just a few
of the most commonly used statistical tools for examining adverse impact).
The EEOC’s “four-fifths rule” is also sometimes used as a rough proxy for
measuring both statistical and practical significance.
55. See id. at 46 (stating that “[c]hoosing the appropriate test depends upon the nature of the selection process,” and, among other things, whether
there are a “variable number of selections” or a “fixed number of selections”).
56. See generally DAVID COPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
(2005) (providing an introduction to statistical analysis for lawyers).
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a. P-Values
Statisticians can “calculate the probability of observing a
difference equal to or greater than that which actually oc57
curred, assuming equal opportunity.” This probability is called
the “p-value,” and by convention, studies with “p-values” of less
58
than 5% are generally considered “statistically significant.” In
other words, if the likelihood of a certain disparity occurring by
chance (i.e., the “null hypothesis”) is less than 5%, then a “majority of scientific journals (and courts)” will deem that dispari59
ty to be statistically significant.
That said, the selection of the “alpha level” (the number
that the “p-value” has to equal or less for the study to be con60
sidered statistically significant) is somewhat arbitrary. Some
researchers have therefore moved towards reporting the “spe61
cific probability (p) of getting a particular result.” Instead of
saying that a certain disparity is “significant at the 0.05 level,”
these researchers might specify that “p = 0.016,” allowing “the
consumer of the data to decide the significance” of the data in
62
question.
b. Confidence Intervals
Alternatively, statisticians can measure the probability
that the “true value” of a parameter lies within a certain “range
63
of values.” This probability is usually referred to as a “confidence interval,” the “margin of error,” or an “interval esti64
mate.” Confidence intervals are “often used” instead of (or in
65
addition to) p-values to measure statistical significance. A

57. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2014).
58. Id.
59. COPE, supra note 56, at 40.
60. See id. (“[N]othing in the definition of statistical significance singles
out 0.05 as the level that must be met for the null hypothesis to be rejected.”).
Multiple regression analysis also requires analysts to choose which variables
to include in their equations. This can add another element of subjectivity into
the process. See D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation,
122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 545 (2008).
61. COPE, supra note 56, at 41 n.10.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 48.
64. Cf. id. (using the term “interval estimate”).
65. Wayne W. LaMorte, Random Error: Confidence Intervals and pValues, BOS. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH
-Modules/EP/EP713_RandomError/EP713_RandomError6.html (last modified
June 6, 2016).
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95% cutoff point for statistical significance is common for confi66
dence intervals. Expressed in statistical terms, “if the null
value is not contained within the 95% confidence interval, then
67
the probability that the null is the true value is less than 5%.”
This means the corresponding p-value “must be [less than]
0.05,” and the documented disparity is likely statistically sig68
nificant.
c. Standard Deviations
Standard deviations are a measure of how much a certain
result differs from the mean of the relevant data set. For example, if a 5’6” height requirement for firefighter applicants would
exclude 90% of female applicants but only 10% of all applicants,
the distance between those two numbers (90% and 10%) could
be measured in terms of standard deviations. There is a rough
correlation between standard deviations and confidence intervals, with two standard deviations “roughly correspond[ing] to
a [95%] confidence interval, meaning that there is a [5%]
chance that the disparity is random,” whereas “three standard
deviations corresponds to roughly a 99.75% confidence interval,
meaning that there is a 0.25% chance that the disparity is ran69
dom.” In the Title VII context, a disparity may usually be considered “statistically significant when it is more than two or
70
three standard deviations from the expected rates.”
Again, the details and respective merits of different tests
for measuring statistical significance are beyond the scope of
this Note. It is enough to observe that each of these tests seeks
to calculate the likelihood that a certain disparity is due to
something more than chance. At the same time, each of these
tests requires the arbitrary selection of a certain value. Statistical significance is really not a yes/no proposition so much as it
is a range in which statisticians can calculate their respective
71
confidence that a certain result is due to more than chance. To

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate
Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 786 (2009).
70. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
n.14 (1977)); see also Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 908 (4th Cir. 2015)
(noting that Hazelwood’s standard deviation test is commonly used for disparate impact claims).
71. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
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express that certainty as a yes/no proposition requires the arbitrary selection of a certain value, below or above which the result can be deemed “statistically significant.”
2. Practical Significance
Unlike statistical significance, practical significance
measures the “real-world importance” of a statistical dispari72
ty. In other words, practical significance asks whether a cer73
tain disparity is large enough to matter. If the size of the dis74
parity is “negligible,” “practical significance is lacking.”
Practical significance, like statistical significance, can be measured in many ways. Two bear mention here: (a) the EEOC’s
four-fifths rule and (b) the “case-by-case” analysis method.
a. The EEOC’s Four-Fifths Rule
75

One method for measuring practical significance is the
EEOC’s “four-fifths rule,” which states that “[a] selection rate
for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
. . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally
be regarded by the federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
76
adverse impact.” Unfortunately, the four-fifths rule is not
clear on whether its reference to the “selection rate” for any
77
group refers to the firing rate or retention rate for that group.

72. COPE, supra note 56, at 52–54.
73. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing the
practical significance inquiry as asking whether a disparity “is sufficiently
large” instead of asking whether that disparity “is nonrandom”); see also
THOMAS, supra note 49, at 25 (describing the practical significance inquiry as
an “additional question” that asks whether an “observed difference[ ]” is “big
enough to be important from a practical perspective”).
74. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
252 (3d ed. 2011). That said, in some fields, even “very small differences . . .
can be of enormous significance” if the consequence of the disparity is significant, or if a very large sample size is involved, such that even a 0.1% difference might affect thousands of people. COPE, supra note 56, at 52–54.
75. As noted above, the four-fifths rule can be used as a rough measure of
both statistical and practical significance. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 47,
at 185 (describing the four-fifths rule as one of several ways to show statistical
significance).
76. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015); see also McKinley, supra note 47, at 177–
78 (giving an example of how the four-fifths rule can be applied in practice).
77. See, e.g., Jones, 752 F.3d at 51–52 (explaining how this ambiguity can
lead to conflicting conclusions even with the same data); Council 31, Am. Fed’n
of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1992)
(giving one example of this problem).
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This “often leads to inconsistent application of the rule.” Many
circuits have rejected mechanical application of the EEOC’s
79
four-fifths rule, but some still use it as a rough rule of thumb.
b. The Case-by-Case Approach
Those courts that have rejected mechanical application of
the EEOC’s four-fifth rules often phrase the practical significance test as an analysis of whether a certain disparity is “sig80
nificant” enough to matter. These courts largely do not distinguish between statistical significance and practical
81
significance. Phrased this way, the practical significance inquiry can take into account not just the quantitative size of the
82
impact, but the “qualitative nature and weight” of its impact.
For example, if a police department with 500 black officers and
1200 white officers “implements a policy leading to the termination of [ninety] black officers and no white officers,” the court
might well determine that this disparity is practically significant, even if the retention rate of black officers (82%) is more
83
than four-fifths of the retention rate of white officers (100%).
Similarly, a court might distinguish between an employment
practice that leads to the firing of one of six black employees
and a practice that leads to the firing of 100 of 600 black employees, even though these two situations would be treated
84
identically under the EEOC’s four-fifths rule. Those courts
that have rejected mechanical application of the EEOC’s fourfifths rule often stress the flexible, fact-dependent nature of
85
their alternative analysis. Either way, practical significance is
86
not a precise or purely mathematical concept. Instead, it in78. Stenger, supra note 6, at 423 n.71.
79. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 47, at 182–85 (describing the split
among circuit courts regarding how much deference should be given to the
four-fifths rule); Stenger, supra note 6, at 422 n.65 (collecting a few cases).
80. See cases cited infra Part I.C.1.
81. See cases cited infra Part I.C.1.
82. Jones, 752 F.3d at 52 (citing Steve Goodman, The Dirty Dozen: Twelve
P-Value Misconceptions, 45 SEMINARS IN HEMATOLOGY 135, 136–37 (2008)).
83. Id. at 51.
84. Id. at 52.
85. See, e.g., Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376
(2d Cir. 1991) (“Courts should take a ‘case-by-case approach’ in judging the
significance or substantiality of disparities, one that considers not only statistics but also all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” (citing Ottaviani v.
State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 372–73 (2d Cir. 1989))); see
also cases cited infra Part I.C.1.
86. Jones, 752 F.3d at 50 (observing that “the concept of practical signifi-
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vites social, legal, and common sense determinations about
whether a certain disparity ought to be large enough to result
87
in liability for a given employer.
3. Statistical vs. Practical Significance: Why This Distinction
Matters
Statistical and practical significance often go together, but
not always. As the American Statistical Association explains:
Statistical significance is not equivalent to scientific, human, or economic significance. Smaller p-values do not necessarily imply the
presence of larger or more important effects, and larger p-values do
not imply a lack of importance or even lack of effect. Any effect, no
matter how tiny, can produce a small p-value if the sample size or
88
measurement precision is high enough . . . .

In other words, with a good study, “even very small differ89
ences can be statistically significant.” This is especially common in studies with “large sample sizes,” where the greater
amount of available data decreases the likelihood that a certain
90
disparity is simply due to chance. For example, in Jones v.
City of Boston, the challenged employment practice (a drug
testing policy) adversely affected 1.3% of African-American of91
ficers and cadets and 0.3% of white officers and cadets. Over
eight years, this employment practice disqualified 55 out of
4222 African-American officers and cadets but only 30 out of
92
10,835 white officers and cadets. This sample size was large
enough to yield a statistical disparity that corresponded to a
93
standard deviation of 7.14 from the expected mean. This dis94
parity was statistically significant. The police department argued, however, that the difference between 0.3% and 1.3% was
not practically significant because very few blacks or whites
cance is impossible to define in even a remotely precise manner,” as there is no
generally accepted “objective measure of practical significance”).
87. Id.
88. Am. Statistical Assoc. Bd. of Dirs., ASA Statement on Statistical Significance and P-Values, AM. STATISTICIAN, June 9, 2016, at 132.
89. Jones, 752 F.3d at 49.
90. Id. at 53; cf. Stenger, supra note 6, at 420–21 (noting that courts will
generally allow plaintiffs to “aggregate data from numerous years in order to
make their proffered sample statistically significant” but may “question[ ] the
viability of aggregation by scrutinizing its probative value in light of other
considerations”).
91. Jones, 752 F.3d at 41.
92. Id. at 44.
93. Id. at 45.
94. Id. at 43–44.
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95

failed the drug test policy. The result in Jones thus turned on
whether the plaintiffs had to prove both statistical and practical significance as part of their prima facie disparate impact
96
case.
Jones is just one example of a case where statistical significance does not necessarily equate to practical significance. The
next Section of this Note collects cases from several circuits
that have required practical significance separately from statistical significance.
C. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The courts are split on whether to define “disparate impact” in terms of statistical or practical significance. A few circuits have tackled this issue head-on and come down on opposite sides of the debate. Other circuits have used language that
only inferentially suggests that they may or may not require a
showing of practical significance separately from statistical
significance. Other circuits do not appear to distinguish between statistical and practical significance at all. This Section
summarizes the existing case law from all twelve circuits on
this issue. Subsection 1 discusses precedents from six circuits
that require something more than statistical significance for
disparate impact claims. Subsection 2 discusses the three circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. Subsection 3
discusses case law from three circuits that have yet to weigh in
on this issue.
1. Circuits Requiring a Showing of Practical Significance
Six circuits—the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh—take a holistic approach to disparate impact claims,
considering both statistical and practical significance. All of
these circuits have indicated that something more than statistical significance may be required for disparate impact claims
in some cases.

95. See id. at 42 (“A very small percentage of officers and cadets, either
white or black, tested positive for cocaine during the period covered by this
lawsuit.”); id. at 48–49 (summarizing the defendant’s practical significance
argument). More specifically, only 55 out of 4222 African-American officers
and 30 out of 10,835 white officers tested positive for cocaine in the eight-year
period that was covered by the lawsuit. Id. at 45.
96. Compare id. at 46–48 (concluding that there was no genuine dispute
that the statistical disparity was statistically significant), with id. at 48–53
(declining to adopt an additional practical significance requirement).

882

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:869

The Second Circuit has concluded that “[c]ourts should
take a ‘case-by-case approach’ in judging the significance or
substantiality of disparities, one that considers not only statis97
tics but also all the surrounding facts and circumstances.”
Even a statistically significant disparity may not be sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact if that disparity is of “limited magnitude” (meaning that the actual size of
98
the disparity is relatively small). A more recent case from the
Second Circuit focuses on statistical significance but quotes approvingly the portion of Waisome that discusses using a “case99
by-case approach” to statistics.
In the same way, the Fourth Circuit has also noted that
statistical significance “is not always synonymous with legal
100
significance.” Statistical disparities that are greater than two
standard deviations are generally considered statistically sig101
nificant. But the usefulness of statistical evidence “depends
102
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Thus,
even though statistical significance is an important part of dis103
parate impact theory, it is not always a sufficient predicate
for a disparate impact claim.
The Fifth Circuit has taken a similar approach. In one
case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment
for the defendant, even where the difference between the ex-

97. Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir.
1991) (citing Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 372–
73 (2d Cir. 1989)).
98. Id.
99. Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 153 (2d Cir. 2012); see
also Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2015) (concluding that a § 1981 or Equal Protection case could be “based on statistics
alone, [but] the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the
mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely”).
100. Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 908 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that
the two-standard deviation test is the most common statistical test for measuring disparate impact).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
340 (1977)). Teamsters, however, was a systemic disparate treatment case, so
courts should not assume that every disparate impact case will also require
the same level of buttressing anecdotal evidence.
103. See Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 336 & n.17 (4th
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat’l, 615 F.2d 147, 151–53
(4th Cir. 1980); Vanguard Justice Soc., Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 698
(D. Md. 1979), decision supplemented, 592 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1984) (referring to a “statistical showing of a significant discrepancy”).
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pected and actual pass rates for a minority group equated to
104
3.93 standard deviations. This difference would typically be
considered statistically significant under the standard deviation test discussed above, but the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the “7.1% selection differential between black and white applicants” was not large enough to support a disparate impact
105
claim. In another case, the Fifth Circuit suggested that it
might not be enough for there to be “a statistically significant
correlation between test scores and experimental ratings” if
“that . . . correlation [was] of very low magnitude and lack[ed]
106
practical significance.” The Fifth Circuit also noted in dicta
that the EEOC’s regulations required a showing of “[p]ractical
107
or operational significance,” not just statistical significance.
The Sixth Circuit has also suggested that a showing of
practical significance may be required in some cases. In Isabel
v. City of Memphis, the Sixth Circuit rejected strict adherence
to the EEOC’s four-fifths rule and advocated for a case-by-case
108
approach to statistical analysis. In doing so, it quoted with
approval the portion of the EEOC regulation that “[s]maller differences in selection rate may nonetheless constitute adverse
impact, where they are significant in both statistical and prac109
tical terms . . . .” Even the dissent in this case appeared to assume that any statistical disparity had to be significant in both
110
statistical and practical terms.
The Ninth Circuit’s position on this question is unclear, but
two of its cases have looked to both statistical and practical
significance to determine whether a disparate impact claim can

104. Moore v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam). The 3.93 standard deviations figure is not from Moore itself, but from
a district court opinion summarizing Moore. See Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of
Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
105. Moore, 593 F.2d at 608.
106. Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980); see also Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 613 F.2d 527, 545 (5th Cir. 1980) (making a similar observation in another case).
107. Ensley, 616 F.2d at 818 n.15; cf. Moore, 593 F.2d at 608 & n.1 (concluding that a 7.1% selection differential was not large enough to qualify as a
“substantially disproportionate impact,” as was required to make out an adverse impact claim).
108. Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2005).
109. Id. at 412 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015)).
110. Id. at 418 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (“[T]he . . . statistical evidence
. . . , while statistically significant, does not rise to the level of a Title VII infraction.”).
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111

go forward. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit seems to have
left open the possibility of some sort of hybrid test allowing
courts to look at both statistical and practical significance, but
without making either one a strict prerequisite for establishing
112
a disparate impact claim.
Since the Eleventh Circuit split off from the Fifth Circuit
in 1981, Fifth Circuit cases decided before that year (including
the Moore and Ensley decisions discussed above) are binding in
113
the Eleventh Circuit. Later cases from the Eleventh Circuit
have also drawn a distinction between statistical and practical
significance and required proof of both for disparate impact
114
claims.
2. Circuits That Do Not Require a Showing of Practical
Significance
Three circuits—the First, Third, and Tenth—have taken a
contrary position. These circuits only require a showing of statistical significance, and not practical significance.
The First Circuit recently held that “a plaintiff’s failure to
demonstrate practical significance cannot preclude that plaintiff from relying on competent evidence of statistical signifi115
cance to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.” It
reached this decision after criticizing the four-fifths rule at
some length and observing that, apart from the four-fifths rule,
it knew of “no statute, regulation, or case law proposing any
116
other mathematical measure of practical significance.”
The Third Circuit has also definitively rejected the practical significance requirement. In Stagi v. National Railroad
111. See Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 515–16, 516 n.1 (9th Cir.
2002); Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1428–29 (9th Cir. 1985);
cf. Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., No 80-436 FR, 1985 WL 25631, at
*34 (D. Or. Feb. 13, 1985), aff ’d, 816 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing
between statistical and practical significance in evaluating a systemic disparate treatment claim).
112. Cf. Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 528 (arguing that even if the defendant
“didn’t understand statistical significance, he would have had to see from the
practical effect of the raises that he was causing . . . discrimination”).
113. Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058, 1059 n.3 (1985) (citing Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)); Hamer v. City of Atlanta,
872 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989).
114. See, e.g., Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1555
(11th Cir. 1994); Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1527–28
(M.D. Ala. 1991).
115. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2014).
116. Jones, 752 F.3d at 52.
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Passenger Corp., the Third Circuit asserted: “We can identify
no Court of Appeals that has found ‘practical significance’ to be
a requirement for a plaintiff’s prima facie case of disparate im117
pact . . . .” Then, after dismissing the reference to practical
significance in the EEOC’s four-fifths rule, the Third Circuit
concluded that because “‘practical’ significance has not been
adopted by our Court, and no other Court of Appeals requires a
showing of practical significance, we decline to require such a
118
showing as part of a plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Consistent
with this rule, a more recent decision from the Third Circuit
used only standard deviation analysis—a test for statistical
significance—to determine whether a plaintiff had established
119
a prima facie disparate impact claim.
The Tenth Circuit has also declined to adopt a practical
significance requirement, but only in a case involving the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In Apsley v. Boeing
Co., the Tenth Circuit observed that the defendant had “cite[d]
no cases supporting a formal ‘practical significance’ require120
ment at the summary judgment stage.” The Tenth Circuit
conceded that even very small disparities could be statistically
significant with large sample sizes but stressed that the “observed [employment] disparity persisted over the course of
eight or nine thousand individual recommendations and of121
fers.” Even though Apsley was an ADEA case, if anything, the
permissible scope of disparate impact claims under Title VII is
122
broader than the scope of similar claims under the ADEA.

117. Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 139 (3d Cir.
2010). The accuracy of this statement is somewhat questionable in light of the
cases discussed above, but perhaps the Third Circuit was only counting circuits that have explicitly adopted a practical significance requirement, without
counting circuits that have adopted a more holistic approach that evaluates
both statistical and practical significance.
118. Id. at 140.
119. Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 372 (3d Cir. 2011).
120. Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 1184, 1199 (10th Cir. 2012).
121. Id. On the other hand, even though the Tenth Circuit may have disagreed with some of the district court’s reasoning, it affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiffs failed to
prove a “systemwide pattern or practice” of discrimination. Id. at 1200. The
plaintiffs’ evidence indicated, at best, that the defendants might have engaged
in “isolated or sporadic instances of . . . discrimination.” Id.
122. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
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3. Circuits Without Clear Precedent on the Need for Practical
Significance
Three circuits—the D.C., Seventh, and Eighth Circuits—
have not clearly indicated whether proof of practical significance should be required for disparate impact claims.
A dissenting D.C. Circuit judge once pointed out that “statistical significance is not the same as practical significance because in isolation . . . [statistical significance] tells nothing
123
about the importance or magnitude of the differences.” But
this was a passing comment in a Federal Communications
124
Commission case. In the Title VII context, at least three district court opinions from the D.C. Circuit have focused on statistical significance, rather than practical significance, to eval125
uate the sufficiency of disparate impact claims.
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly used standard deviation analysis to determine whether a certain disparity is statis126
tically significant. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit
has encouraged courts to avoid using the two-to-three standard
deviations test as a bright line test, leaving open the applica127
tion of some sort of practical significance test. And at least
one district court case from the Seventh Circuit has argued for
a more thorough and holistic approach for evaluating both sta128
tistical and practical significance.
123. Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621,
642 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Robinson, J., dissenting in part).
124. Id. The main question in this case was whether the FCC had a duty to
give two minority associations a hearing to challenge the FCC’s renewal of the
broadcast licenses for two radio stations that allegedly discriminated against
racial minorities. See id. at 624. Furthermore, this D.C. Circuit judge made
this comment only after noting that the FCC could “employ standards different
from those utilized by the EEOC in carrying out its mandate” because the
FCC’s main concern was with “intentional discrimination,” whereas the EEOC
was “chartered to search out and remedy both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect.” Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
125. See Delgado v. Ashcroft, No. 99-2311 (JR), 2003 WL 24051558, at *8
(D.D.C. May 29, 2003); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F. Supp. 1054, 1063
(D.D.C. 1992); Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952,
966–67 (D.D.C. 1980), aff ’d, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1981). What these cases
did not clarify is whether a showing of statistical significance is a sufficient,
necessary, or just possible element of a disparate impact claim.
126. See, e.g., Bew v. City of Chicago, 252 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 2001);
Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 426–27 (7th Cir. 2000); Coates
v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 536–40 (7th Cir. 1985).
127. Coates, 765 F.2d at 537 n.11, 547 n.22 (quoting EEOC v. Am. Nat’l.
Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1192 (4th Cir. 1981)).
128. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–88 (N.D.
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The Eighth Circuit has also used standard deviation anal129
ysis to evaluate the sufficiency of disparate impact claims. It
has stated that “[a] difference of two or three standard deviations is statistically significant at the [5%] significance level”
and observed that a difference of 5.5 standard deviations (corresponding with a pass rate of 98% of whites but only 84% of
130
blacks) is “highly unlikely” to be “due to chance.” On the other hand, in another part of its opinion, it concluded that this
difference in admission rates was “significant in both statistical
and practical terms,” suggesting that it might be using standard deviation analysis in conjunction with the actual disparity
of admitted students to establish both statistical and practical
131
significance.
***
Disparate impact claims require proof that a certain employment practice has a “disparate impact” on members of a
132
protected class. Statistical significance is a test for determining whether a statistical disparity is due to something more
133
than random chance. Practical significance is a test for determining whether that disparity is large enough to have real134
world importance. Most disparities that are statistically sig135
nificant will also be practically significant, but not always.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has clarified whether
Title VII requires plaintiffs to prove that a certain employment
practice disproportionately affects members of a protected class
in a way that is both statistically and practically significant, or
136
just the former. This has created a split among the circuits on
137
this issue.

Ill. 1986), aff ’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
129. Hameed v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union No. 396, 637 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 1980).
130. Id. at 513–14.
131. Id. at 514.
132. See supra Part I.A.
133. See supra Part I.B.1.
134. See supra Part I.B.2.
135. See supra Part I.B.3.
136. See supra Part I.C.
137. See supra Part I.C.
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II. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PRACTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE STANDARD
This Part argues that practical significance should not be
required for disparate impact claims. It makes both legal and
practical arguments against the adoption of the practical significance standard. Section A explains how the ordinary meaning
of the words “disparate” and “impact” in Title VII can refer to
any statistically significant disparity, no matter how small.
Section B notes the inconclusiveness of the legislative history
on this issue. Section C explains why past Supreme Court precedents need not be interpreted as requiring a practical significance requirement. Section D argues that the EEOC’s implicit
endorsement of the practical significance requirement should
not receive controlling deference from the courts. Section E
suggests that practical significance should not be required for
disparate impact claims because practical significance is basically a test for proximate causation—a requirement lacking
from the actual text of Title VII. Finally, Section F argues that
the current formulation of the practical significance test is
problematic because it is so amorphous as to be essentially arbitrary.
A. THE TEXT DOES NOT SUPPORT A PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
STANDARD
138

Title VII does not define the term “disparate impact.”
Even so, the text of Title VII is instructive in several ways.
First, courts may look to the common dictionary definition
of a statutory term when that term is not separately defined in
139
the statute. Here, courts must decide whether the term “disparate impact” refers to any difference in how an employment
practice affects a protected class, or only a large difference in
how the employment practice affects that class.
On one hand, several dictionaries define the word “disparate” as meaning “[f]undamentally distinct or different in
140
141
kind,” “entirely dissimilar,” “markedly distinct in quality or

138. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (defining many other terms, but not “disparate impact”).
139. Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 783 (2010) (“[W]e may look to dictionaries . . . to determine the meaning of words the Code does not define . . . .”).
140. Disparate, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2015).
141. Id.
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character,” or “essentially different or diverse in kind.” Oxford’s English Dictionary gives this example of how the word
can be used: “As remote in their nature . . . as any two dispar144
ate things we can propose or conceive . . . .” Arguably, then,
even statistically significant differences may not be “disparate”
impacts under Title VII if they are so small that they are not
“markedly” “distinct in quality or character.”
On the other hand, Oxford’s English Dictionary also defines “disparate” as meaning “essentially different,” “dissimi145
lar,” “unlike,” “distinct,” or “unequal.” It also gives several
examples where authors have referred to two things that are
146
“utterly” or “very” disparate. If the word “disparate,” standing
alone, only encompassed large or extreme differences between
two things, it would be redundant to qualify it with the adverbs
“utterly” or “very.” Arguably, then, the word “disparate” refers
to any statistically significant disparity of any size.
Second, courts generally should not read into a statute additional requirements that Congress has not itself placed in the
147
statute. Title VII does not require plaintiffs to prove that an
employment practice had a “large” impact on a protected
148
class. Title VII just requires plaintiffs to prove that “a partic149
ular employment practice” had a disparate impact on a protected class. Thus, courts should not read an additional magnitude requirement into Title VII’s disparate impact claims.
Title VII only requires proof of a “disparate impact,” not
proof of a “very” disparate impact that is large enough to warrant societal or moral condemnation. Thus, any time a challenged employment practice impacts a protected class more
harshly than a non-protected class, that should be enough to
establish a Title VII violation, whether the challenged employment practice affects the protected class in a small or large
way.

142. Disparate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/disparate (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
143. Disparate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/54914?redirectedFrom=disparate#eid (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
144. Id. (quoting 2 THOMAS BURNET, THE SACRED THEORY OF THE EARTH
302 (1719)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012).
149. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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At this point, proponents of a practical significance requirement may argue that the preceding argument proves too
much. To be consistent, they might say, the preceding argument would also require abolition of the statistical significance
requirement. If the smallest disparity is enough to establish a
Title VII violation, does that mean even a statistically insignificant disparity should be enough to support a disparate impact
claim? Not necessarily, because the statistical significance requirement, unlike the practical significance requirement, is
grounded in a different part of the text. In expounding a stat150
ute, courts must “look to the provisions of the whole law,”
keeping in mind that “a word is known by the company it
151
keeps.” In this case, Title VII requires plaintiffs to prove that
a particular employment practice “cause[d] a disparate impact”
152
on the basis of a protected characteristic. Statistical significance, unlike practical significance, is at least inferentially re153
lated to causation.
For these reasons, although the text of Title VII is somewhat ambiguous, the better view is to read the text as requiring
only a showing of statistical significance. Disparate impact
plaintiffs should only have to prove that the challenged employment practice had “a” disparate impact on a protected
class, however small.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT SUPPORT A PRACTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE STANDARD
The legislative history for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is inconclusive. But it contains three statements that suggest that
Title VII’s disparate impact provisions were originally intended
to only require a showing of statistical significance.
First, during the debate on the original Civil Rights Act of
1964, a senator read from an article which quoted an expert
statistician as saying that a variance of 2.2% between the passage rate of minorities and non-minorities was “not statistically
significant,” but a “variance of 6[%]. . . could be considered sig154
nificant.” Neither this senator nor any other senator made
150. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).
151. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
153. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
154. 110 CONG. REC. 9041 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Tower).
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any reference to any additional requirement of “practical significance.”
Second, in a Senate committee hearing for the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 (an early precursor to the Civil Rights Act of 1991
that was ultimately enacted into law), a labor economist noted
that “even a statistically significant disparity” between the employment rates of minorities and non-minorities might not
“constitute[] conclusive evidence of race . . . discrimination by
155
that employer.” He explained that “statistical significance”
only measured whether a disparity was “due to something other than pure ‘chance,’” but “even if the hypothetical disparity
were found to be ‘statistically significant,’” this did “not mean
156
that the disparity [was] necessarily due to discrimination.”
These statements apparently assumed that statistical signifi157
cance was the relevant test for disparate impact claims.
Third, during a House subcommittee hearing for the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, a lawyer and former commissioner of the
EEOC suggested that the term “disparate impact” should be
158
defined in terms of statistical significance. She said the following:
Although . . . [the Civil Rights Act of 1991] does not contain a definition as to what “disparate impact” is, I would hope that the Committee would consider using the definitions previously used by the Supreme Court to limit the term by applying standards of statistical
159
significance of two or three standard deviations . . . .

Again, as discussed above, standard deviations are a
measure of statistical significance (i.e., statistical correlation),
160
not practical significance.
All three of these statements referred specifically to statistical significance. Read together, they suggest that Congress
understood the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to only require the
plaintiff to prove that a certain employment practice had a sta155. Hearing on S. 2104 Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res.,
101st Cong. 298 (1990) (statement of Paul J. Andrisani, Professor, Human Resource Management, Temple University).
156. Id. at 299.
157. See id. at 298.
158. Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional
Rights, 102d Cong. 158–59 (statement of Cathie A. Shattuck, Partner, Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C.).
159. Id. Shattuck also made a passing reference to the EEOC’s four-fifths
rule in her testimony. But that reference is not inconsistent with an implicit
endorsement of a statistical significance standard because the EEOC’s fourfifths rule can be used as a rough proxy for statistical or practical significance.
160. See supra Part I.B.1.
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tistically significant disparate impact on members of a protected class.
C. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT SUPPORT A
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE STANDARD
The Supreme Court has never clearly specified “just what
threshold mathematical showing of variance” is required for
161
Its precedents, however, do not
disparate impact claims.
clearly support a practical significance standard requirement
for two reasons.
First, Griggs itself does not require any showing of practical significance. Rather, it broadly prohibits the use of any em162
ployment practice “which operates to exclude” minorities. An
employment practice that results in a statistically significant
disparity “operates to exclude” minorities, whether it only ex163
cludes one or a million minority employees. Thus, Griggs
suggests that any statistically significant disparity should be
sufficient to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim un164
der Title VII.
Second, in Hazelwood School District v. United States, the
Court stated that a “difference between the expected value and
the observed number” that “is greater than two or three standard deviations” will generally be sufficient to infer some sort of
165
violation of Title VII. As explained above, standard deviations
161. LINDEMANN, supra note 14, at 124 (quoting Moore v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).
162. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
163. It is true that Griggs struck down a high school degree requirement
that disqualified African Americans at a “substantially higher rate than white
applicants.” Id. at 426 (emphasis added). This, however, was the Court’s description of the effect of the employment practice in Griggs, not the actual rule
from Griggs. The fact that a “substantially” discriminatory employment practice may be sufficient to establish a Title VII violation does not mean that a
showing of a “substantial” disparity is a necessary part of every disparate impact claim. Further, even if a “substantial” disparity is a necessary part of every disparate impact claim, that still leaves unanswered the question of whether “substantiality” only requires a showing of statistical significance or a
showing of both statistical and practical significance.
164. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424. A Fifth Amendment case, Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), has described Title VII as prohibiting hiring practices that “disqualif[y] substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks.” Id.
at 247 (emphasis added). Davis was a Fifth Amendment case, not a Title VII
case, however, so its statements about the scope of Title VII are dicta. Cf. id.
at 246–48 (declining to import Title VII standards wholesale into the Court’s
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence).
165. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977)
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are a measure of statistical significance, not practical signifi166
cance. Hazelwood was a systematic disparate treatment case,
not a disparate impact case. However, following Hazelwood’s
lead, many courts have used the same standard deviation test
to evaluate the statistical significance of disparate impact
167
claims.
Proponents of a practical significance requirement may
point out that the Court has described the prima facie test (in
five cases decided between 1975 and 1988) as requiring the
plaintiff to prove that the challenged employment practice re168
sulted in a “significant statistical disparity” or a “significant
169
adverse effect[]” on a protected group or otherwise harmed
170
the plaintiff in a “significantly different,” “significantly great171
172
er,” or “significantly discriminatory” way. But none of these
cases specifically required a showing of practical significance.
These references to a “significantly” different impact on minority employees can be read as requiring proof of statistical or
practical significance.
Proponents of a practical significance requirement may also point out that a plurality of the Supreme Court stated in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank that the test for Title VII has “nev173
er been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula.”
The same plurality disclaimed exclusive reliance on standard
deviation analysis and instead urged that “the ‘significance’ or
‘substantiality’ of numerical disparities” should be evaluated
174
“on a case-by-case basis.” To the extent that statistical significance tends to be more of a mathematical concept, and practical significance tends to be a more flexible approach, this
statement tends to support a practical significance requirement
for disparate impact claims. However, these two quotes come
from Part II-D of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. This part of Jus(quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977)).
166. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
167. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2014);
Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 372 (3d Cir. 2011).
168. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 986 (plurality opinion).
170. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
171. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585–87 (1979).
172. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
173. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994–95.
174. Id. at 995 n.3.
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tice O’Connor’s opinion only commanded four votes
176
is not controlling.

and thus

D. THE EEOC’S FOUR-FIFTHS RULE SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN
CONTROLLING DEFERENCE
Proponents of the practical significance requirement sometimes cite to the EEOC’s four-fifths rule to support their position. As discussed above, the EEOC’s four-fifths rule is some177
times used as a rough proxy for practical significance. The
rule itself states that “[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or
ethnic group which is less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the
group with the highest rate will generally be . . . evidence of
adverse impact,” but “[s]maller differences . . . may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in
178
both statistical and practical terms.” In the EEOC’s view,
then, disparate impact claims require a showing of both statistical and practical significance.
This interpretation of Title VII, however, should not receive significant deference from the courts. If Congress has
“delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,” and “the agency interpretation . . . was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” courts must give
Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of the stat179
ute. Chevron deference means that courts must defer to the
agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as the agency’s interpretation is a permissible reading of an ambiguous stat180
ute. This is a “highly deferential” standard that requires
courts to defer even to many agency interpretations with which
181
they disagree.
175. See id. at 982 (recording that only three Justices joined Parts II.C and
II.D of Justice O’Connor’s opinion).
176. When no one opinion commands a majority of the Court, the controlling holding is the position taken by the Justices “who concurred in the judgment[ ] on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977). In Watson, this would have been Justice Stevens’ opinion, not Parts
II.C and II.D of Justice O’Connor’s opinion.
177. See supra Part I.B.2.
178. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015) (emphasis added).
179. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
180. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984).
181. See Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 51 & n.316 (2006) (noting that there are only a handful of
cases where the Supreme Court has refused to defer to an agency interpretation at Step 2 of Chevron).
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In this case, however, the EEOC does not have “rulemaking authority to interpret the substantive provisions of Title
182
VII.” It only has congressional authority to issue “procedural
183
regulations” governing “the administrative stage of discrimi184
nation complaints.” This means that the EEOC’s four-fifths
185
rule is not entitled to Chevron deference from the courts.
Instead, the EEOC’s four-fifths rule is only entitled to
186
Skidmore deference. This means that it will be followed by
the courts only in light of “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
187
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” The
EEOC has provided little justification for its four-fifths rule,
188
and both scholars and courts have often criticized this rule.
At various times, scholars have referred to this test as “suffi189
ciently inflexible and statistically dubious” or as an “inappropriate benchmark” in cases where not “all groups are equally
190
well qualified on average.” Courts have also criticized the mechanical application of the four-fifths rule to studies with small

182. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 122 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)
(citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–46 (1976)).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012).
184. Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 2003).
185. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Stagi v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2010) (reaching the
same conclusion specifically in regards to the four-fifths rule); Thomas W.
Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 760 (2014)
(noting that the Supreme Court has consistently given only Skidmore deference to EEOC interpretations).
186. See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 257.
187. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
188. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3
(1988) (observing that this rule “has been criticized on technical grounds”);
Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 51–52 (1st Cir. 2014) (listing three problems with the four-fifths rule and citing other circuit court cases that have
“minimized the importance of the four-fifths rule” or “criticized it directly”).
189. Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
2157, 2197 n.187 (2013); see also Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal
Statistical Analysis of the Data in Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder
Inferences than the U.S. Government’s “Four-Fifths” Rule: An Examination of
the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 L. PROB. & RISK 171, 187–90
(2009) (comparing the four-fifths rule to other statistical methods and concluding that “formal statistical analysis of . . . data . . . in disparate impact [cases]
yields sounder inferences than simply relying on the ‘four-fifths’ rule”).
190. Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621,
662 (2011).
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sample sizes that “tend to produce inherently unreliable re191
sults.” This is not to say that the four-fifths rule cannot be a
“helpful rule of thumb” for employers wishing to avoid potential
Title VII liability without engaging in a more robust statistical
192
analysis. The fact remains, however, that the four-fifths rule
has not been persuasively justified by the EEOC or consistently
193
followed by the courts. As such, the four-fifths rule’s passing
reference to practical significance should not be given much
deference from the courts.
E. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS ESSENTIALLY A TEST OF
LEGAL /PROXIMATE CAUSATION, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE READ
INTO THE TEXT OF TITLE VII
At their core, arguments in favor of a practical significance
requirement may stem from the belief that the law should not
impose liability on employers who adopt employment practices
that unintentionally affect minorities in a small or remote way.
As a policy matter, this is a reasonable position, as many other
areas of law distinguish between intentional and unintentional
wrongdoers and cut off the liability of unintentional wrongdoers for harm that is unforeseeable or otherwise too remote to
have been proximately caused by the defendant’s behavior.
Title VII, however, does not include any sort of proximate
194
cause requirement. All that it requires is for the plaintiff to
prove that the challenged employment practice “cause[d]” a
195
disparate impact on the basis of a protected characteristic. As
discussed above, statistical significance is a better measure
than practical significance of the correlation between a challenged employment practice and the alleged effect of that em196
ployment practice on a protected class. Although it can never
prove causation, it can at least measure the likelihood that a

191. EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Joint Indus. Bd. of the Elec.
Indus., 164 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 1998).
192. Jones, 752 F.3d at 51.
193. See cases cited supra note 188.
194. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that
courts should not read a proximate cause element into most discrimination
statutes); Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1199 (2013) (same).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
196. See supra Part I.B.1.
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certain disparity is due to something more than random
197
chance.
F. THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE WAY TO MEASURE PRACTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE
The main argument against adopting a practical significance requirement is the difficulty in coming up with a workable and consistent way to test for practical significance, apart
from the four-fifths rule, which has its own problems, as discussed above. The First Circuit has observed that “the concept
of practical significance is impossible to define in even a remotely precise manner,” and there is no objective or mathematical way to measure practical significance, apart from the four198
fifths rule. As discussed above, those who have attempted to
define practical significance without relying on the four-fifths
rule have usually defined practical significance as meaning a
difference that is “big enough to be important from a practical
199
perspective.” That formulation is inoffensive but useless. It
does nothing more than to beg the question. In practice, then,
despite the superficial attractions of a practical significance requirement, it is extremely difficult to apply it “in any principled
200
and predictable manner.”
To be fair, this problem is not unique to practical significance. Other areas of law also employ flexible, multi-factor
tests. For example, Skidmore deference has been described as a
“sliding scale” approach under which the deference owed to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute depends on an ad hoc
201
202
weighing of several factors. Other subjects like torts, con203
204
205
tracts, federal jurisdiction, or constitutional law also reg197. See supra Part I.B.1.
198. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2014).
199. THOMAS, supra note 49, at 25; discussion supra Part I.B.2.
200. Jones, 752 F.3d at 53.
201. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009); Kristin E.
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1259 (2007).
202. After all, tort law is the home of the “reasonable person” standard that
terrorizes thousands of first-year law students every year. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282–283 (1965).
203. For example, some courts define “unconscionability” as meaning a
contract which “is so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the
mores and business practices of the time and place as to be unenforcible [sic]
according to its literal terms.” Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534
N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (quoting Mandel v. Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152
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ularly require courts to exercise “reasoned judgment” on a
case-by-case basis. Even statistical significance analysis requires statisticians to pick a certain “significance level” for the
207
study.
But the current test for practical significance is different. It
does not just allow the court to engage in “reasoned judg208
209
ment.” Courts have been doing that for years. Instead, the
test for practical significance “begin[s] by begging the ques210
tion.” It gives the judge no factors to guide her in making her
decision. It just asks the judge to decide whether a given disparity is practically significant based on the judge’s “common
sense.” Because this formulation is practically impossible to
211
apply “in any principled and predictable manner,” courts
should not require practical significance in Title VII cases.
To recap, the text of Title VII only requires a showing of
“disparate” impact, not a “large” or “practically significant” dis212
parity. The legislative history for Title VII does not support a
213
practical significance requirement. Supreme Court precedent
214
is unclear on this question. The EEOC has endorsed a practical significance requirement, but courts need not defer to the
215
EEOC’s interpretation of this portion of Title VII. Statistical
significance is a better measure of actual causation than practi216
cal significance. And the courts have largely failed to come up
217
with a workable definition of practical significance.

(N.Y. 1951)).
204. Even impersonal concepts like justiciability can require courts to
make judgment calls on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.
Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013) (extending federal jurisdiction to state law claims that
necessarily implicate “substantial” federal questions).
205. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 986
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (describing the joint opinion’s “undue burden” test as an “inherently manipulable” standard).
206. Id. at 849 ( joint opinion).
207. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
208. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 ( joint opinion).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting and concurring in part).
211. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 2014).
212. See supra Part II.A.
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. See supra Part II.C.
215. See supra Part II.D.
216. See supra Part II.E.
217. See supra Part II.F.
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III. WHAT THEN? THE CASE FOR EVALUATING ONLY
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OR DEVELOPING A MORE
CONCRETE TEST FOR PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The courts are split on whether practical significance
should be required separately from statistical significance. And
those courts that require some showing of practical significance
have little guidance to aid them in determining how to measure
practical significance. This Part proposes two alternative solutions to this issue. Section A suggests that plaintiffs should not
be required to prove practical significance as part of their prima facie cases. It suggests that the phrase “disparate impact”
in Title VII should be read as referring broadly to any statistical disparity that is statistically significant, regardless of the
size of that disparity. It also explains how courts can rely on
other legal doctrines to address the policy concerns behind the
practical significance requirement. Alternatively, Section B
suggests that courts can keep the practical significance requirement but address the vagueness issue with that requirement by developing a more concrete test for measuring practical significance.
A. COURTS SHOULD ABOLISH THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
REQUIREMENT
This Section makes the case for abolishing the practical
significance requirement as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie
case. This means that disparate impact plaintiffs should be
able to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact by
simply showing that a challenged employment practice impacts
minority employees in a statistically significant way. Subsection 1 argues that abolishing the practical significance requirement would further the purposes of Title VII. Subsection 2
explains how the policy concerns embodied in the practical significance can be addressed using other existing Title VII rules.
1. Abolishing the Practical Significance Requirement Would
Further the Purposes of Title VII
This Subsection argues that abolishing the practical significance requirement would further the purposes of Title VII in
three ways. First, this would help eliminate barriers to employment opportunity that keep minority applicants and employees from getting positions for which they are perfectly qualified. Second, to the extent that disparate impact claims are
justified as a way to “smoke out” hidden discrimination, abol-
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ishing the practical significance requirement would encourage
hiring based on merit rather than unarticulated (or sometimes
even unconscious) biases. Third, because statistical significance
is a more objective measure than practical significance, relying
solely on statistical significance would make it easier for employers to comply with Title VII ahead of time to avoid expo218
sure to liability.
First, disparate impact theory can help eliminate barriers
to employment opportunities for all applicants and employees.
Even if an employment practice does not discriminate on the
basis of race or gender, it can discourage employers from hiring
219
or promoting the most qualified applicants or employees.
Consider the case of an employer who refuses to hire anyone
with a criminal record. A blanket prohibition like this could adversely affect certain racial minorities. To address this problem, the EEOC issued policy statements in 1987, 1990, and
2012, encouraging employers to replace categorical bans on hiring convicted offenders with “a more nuanced approach, taking
into account the nature of the offense, the nature of the position
220
sought, and how much time has passed since the conviction.”
If courts require plaintiffs to prove that a certain employment
practice impacts a large number of people, employers will have
less incentive to eliminate roadblocks to opportunity that only
affect small numbers of their employees. Conversely, adopting
a pure statistical significance standard for disparate impact
claims would help eliminate small but statistically significant
barriers to employment opportunity for all workers.
Second, disparate impact theory can help “smoke out” hid221
den discrimination, in both its intentional and unintention218. This Note takes no position on whether Title VII’s primary purpose
should be to eliminate barriers to employment opportunity, smoke out hidden
discrimination, or make it easier for employers to voluntarily comply with its
provisions. It simply argues that a statistical significance standard would further all of these policy goals.
219. See generally Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429 (2014) (describing
how even facially non-discriminatory employment practices can prevent qualified workers from accessing employment opportunities).
220. Id. at 1460.
221. In the twenty-first century, employers who want to discriminate
against minorities may use coded language or unnecessarily restrictive employment requirements to screen out applicants whom they do not wish to
hire. Cf. Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-Coding” Colorblind Slurs
During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611,
613 (2000) (noting that modern racism is often expressed in “coded” form to
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al forms. Abolishing the practical significance requirement as
part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case will allow more disparate
impact claims to survive a motion to dismiss, require more employers to justify challenged employment practices on the basis
of business necessity, and root out more cases of hidden discrimination in the process. Hopefully, this process will also help
employers be more aware of their intentional and unintentional
biases.
Third, abolishing the practical significance requirement
would help employers manage their liability under Title VII.
Congress did not want Title VII to impose excessive compliance
223
costs on employers. This was the primary impetus behind
Congress’s decision to exempt small businesses from Title VII’s
224
coverage. Practical significance is a slippery (and often circularly defined) concept, whereas statistical significance has a
generally accepted definition in employment law circles. Therefore, a pure statistical significance standard would make it easier for employers to know exactly what Title VII requires.
2. The Policy Concerns Embodied in the Practical Significance
Requirement Can Be Addressed Using Other Title VII Rules
The practical significance requirement does limit the scope
of disparate impact liability. This can be a good thing insofar as
it limits government intrusion into private business deci225
sions, especially when “very small impacts are unlikely to be
avoid public censure). As Justice Scalia observed in his concurrence in Ricci, a
disparate impact is “sometimes (though not always) a signal of ” invidious discrimination. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009). Unsurprisingly,
then, statistical disparities can sometimes be used as evidence of intentional
discrimination to support a disparate treatment claim. See id.
222. Most people have hidden prejudices that even they may not recognize.
For the seminal work on this problem, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The I, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987). Disparate impact theory can help address these implicit biases by striking at employer conduct that reflects these unintentional biases. See
Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision
and the Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 29, 41–43 (2010).
223. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton); id.
13092–93 (statement of Sen. Morse).
224. See id. at 13088 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
225. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015) (“[D]isparate-impact liability must be limited so
employers and other regulated entities are able to make the practical business
choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic freeenterprise system.”); Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370,
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the product of intentional discrimination.” But courts can limit the scope of disparate impact liability without requiring a
showing of practical significance for disparate impact claims.
Three other rules already limit the scope of disparate impact
liability: (a) the statistical significance requirement; (b) the
causation requirement; and (c) the business necessity defense.
a. The First Safeguard—Statistical Significance
Statistical and practical significance tend to go hand-inhand. In most cases, small disparities that are of a “limited
magnitude” will neither be statistically nor practically significant. To the extent that courts believe that small statistical
disparities should not support disparate impact claims, the statistical significance requirement should be enough, standing
227
alone, to weed out most “limited magnitude” cases. Not only
so, the statistical significance requirement is easier to apply in
an objective manner than the practical significance require228
ment. And the statistical significance requirement may actually be more effective than the four-fifths rule at weeding out
229
small-impact cases in situations with small sample sizes.
Any discrepancy between statistical and practical significance usually arises only with large sample sizes. In Jones, for
example, the parties brought suit only after collecting eight
230
years of data with “thousands of test results.” However, such
231
large sample sizes “are often unavailable.” Even when such
large samples are available, the time and expense needed to
comb through reams of such data should protect employers
from being sued on a daily basis for every conceivable employ232
ment practice. And if a plaintiff is willing to go through this
trouble to challenge an employment practice that affects hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of similarly situated applicants

1376–77 (2d Cir. 1991) (assuming that disparities that are of a “limited magnitude” should not result in disparate impact liability).
226. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 2014).
227. Jones, 752 F.3d at 53.
228. See discussion supra Part III.A.
229. See supra Part II.C (pointing out the failings of the four-fifths rule in
this situation).
230. Jones, 752 F.3d at 44.
231. Id. at 53.
232. Cf. id. (noting the need for extensive data in these cases).
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or employees, the defendant most likely will be a larger busi233
ness with more resources to defend against the lawsuit.
b. The Second Safeguard—Causation
Disparate impact law requires the plaintiff to prove that a
specific employment practice caused the alleged disparate im234
pact. This requirement “protects defendants from being held
liable for racial disparities they did not create” and prevents Ti235
tle VII from morphing into a de facto racial quota system. It
also keeps every employment practice from being actionable as
a disparate impact violation.
c. The Third Safeguard—The Business Necessity Defense
Until this point, this Note has focused on the plaintiff’s
prima facie disparate impact claim. It is worth noting, however,
that the employer retains an affirmative defense of business
necessity. Employment practices that have a disparate impact
on members of a protected class may nevertheless be permitted
236
if they are “consistent with business necessity.” This requires,
in most cases, a case-by-case evaluation of all of the evidence.
For example, education requirements and height requirements
may be justified by business necessity in some cases but not in
237
others. In Jones, the plaintiffs conceded that the police department had a legitimate purpose in ensuring that its police

233. This concern with the size of the business being sued reflects the special concern for small businesses that Congress codified when it explicitly exempted small businesses from the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (defining the term “employer” to include only
businesses with fifteen or more employees).
234. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B). There is a limited exception that allows all
employment practices to be analyzed together as one general cause of disparate impact.
235. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 653 (1989)).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited.”).
237. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (striking
down a height and weight requirement for prison guards when the defendant
failed to show that there was a correlation between height, weight, and
strength); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26 (striking down a high school diploma requirement for blue-collar jobs at a power plant because this requirement was
not “significantly related to successful job performance”).
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officers did not use illegal drugs. The First Circuit thus remanded the case to the district court to consider the department’s argument that its drug testing program was “consistent
239
with business necessity.”
B. IF COURTS DO NOT WISH TO ABOLISH THE PRACTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE REQUIREMENT, THEY SHOULD ADOPT A MORE
CONCRETE TEST FOR MEASURING PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
A less drastic approach would be to keep the practical significance requirement as a way for employers to rebut the presumption that a statistically significant disparity is a “substantial disparity” for the purposes of Title VII. If the courts keep
the practical significance test, however, they should develop a
more concrete test for measuring practical significance. This
would avoid many of the problems with the current formulation
of practical significance as an ad hoc “I know it when I see it”
test.
To that end, this Note lists several factors that courts could
consider in determining whether a disparity is substantial
240
enough to be significant in practical terms.
Courts could consider the percentage difference between
the effects of an employment practice on minority and nonminority employees. In Jones, for example, where an employment practice disqualified 1.30% of black employees but only
0.27% of white employees, there was a 1.03% difference in how
241
the employment practice affected black employees.
Alternatively, courts could evaluate the same disparity by
dividing the percentage of affected non-minority employees by
the percentage of affected minority employees. In Jones, for example, the challenged employment practice disqualified almost
five times as many black employees as white employees, as
242
1.30% ÷ 0.27% = 4.81. This, incidentally, was how the plaintiffs in Jones characterized the statistical disparity.
Another option would be to look at the absolute percentage
of individuals affected by the challenged employment practice.
238. Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 54 (1st Cir. 2014).
239. Id. at 54–55.
240. This list is illustrative only. Brighter minds can debate the relative
merits of different tests for practical significance. This Note only suggests that
a multi-factor test for practical significance would be an improvement over a
circular definition of practical significance.
241. Jones, 752 F.3d at 44.
242. Id.
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In Jones, for example, the challenged employment practice dis243
qualified 1.30% of the department’s black officers and cadets.
Yet another option would be to consider the absolute number of individuals affected by the challenged employment practice. The higher this number, the more practically significant
the disparity, even if the actual percentage difference of individuals affected is relatively small. For example, if “a series of
clinical trials produced statistically significant results suggesting that the survival rates associated with the two treatments
were 67.2% and 67.3%,” although a difference of 0.1% might
seem relatively unimportant, “if 1 million people suffer from
the type of heart disease in question, using the better treat244
ment will save, on average, 1000 lives a year.” In Jones, the
department’s drug testing policy disqualified fifty-five African245
American police officers over an eight-year period.
A slightly different approach would be to focus on the qualitative nature of a disparate impact rather than its qualitative
size. After all, in the medical field, “a small percentage increase
in [the] mild side effects” of a drug would probably be considered less significant than “the same percentage increase in fa246
talities.” In the employment context, courts could similarly
evaluate the qualitative effect of the challenged employment
practice. Has it just resulted in some relatively “minor” adverse
employment action? Or has it had more serious effects, like requiring the outright firing of several minority employees?
This is a “second-best” solution. This Note primarily argues
that courts should simply abolish the practical significance requirement and rely on other rules to address the policy con247
cerns behind the practical significance requirement. But if a
court decides not to abolish the practical significance requirement, it should consider adopting a set of factors for measuring
practical significance rather than simply telling district court
judges to use their “common sense” to determine when a cer248
tain disparity is significant enough to matter. That test for
249
practical significance is unhelpful.
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COPE, supra note 56, at 524.
Jones, 752 F.3d at 44.
Id. at 52.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.F.
See supra Part II.F.
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In short, courts should either abolish the practical significance requirement or come up with a more concrete way for
measuring practical significance.
CONCLUSION
Statistical and practical significance are two distinct concepts. Statistical significance measures the likelihood that a
statistical anomaly is attributable to something more than
chance. Practical significance focuses on the size of the observed disparity. Ignoring the distinction between these two
concepts has obscured the development of disparate impact
theory and has made it more difficult for judges to apply (and
employers to comply with) Title VII.
The circuit courts are split on whether disparate impact
claims require proof of both statistical and practical significance. The Supreme Court has also given very little guidance in
this area. However, the plain meaning of the term “disparate
impact” includes any discrepancy between two sets of results
and thus suggests that any statistically significant disparity
should satisfy the plaintiffs’ burden of proof on their disparate
impact claims. The legislative history also indicates that the
term “disparate impact” was meant to refer to all statistically
significant disparities, without any additional requirement of
practical significance. Further, there is no sound, objective
standard for measuring practical significance, and the concerns
behind the practical significance can be addressed more consistently and objectively under existing Title VII rules—
specifically, the statistical significance requirement, the causation requirement, and the business necessity defense. This
Note thus urges courts to require only proof of statistical significance in disparate impact claims, putting to rest the fuzzy concept of practical significance that has hitherto plagued our Title
VII jurisprudence. Courts that insist on keeping the practical
significance requirement should consider adopting a more concrete test for measuring practical significance.

